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2.1  Introduction 
This paper examines tax incentives for personal saving in Canada. It pays 
particular attention to tax-deferred retirement savings plans and focuses on the 
period since 1970, during which there have been major changes in the Cana- 
dian tax system. These changes have been on such a scale that a discernible 
impact on saving behavior would not be surprising. It is not our task here to 
measure these effects. Instead, our purpose is to investigate carefully the struc- 
ture of incentives, and their changes over time, as groundwork for future at- 
tempts at such measurement. 
The period studied started with the introduction of capital gains taxation (in 
1972),  but the tenor of tax developments quickly changed, with the appearance 
of  a whole  stable of  new  shelters for  saving in  1974 and the enrichment 
of previously existing shelters, such as the well-known registered retirement 
savings plans  (RRSPs) and registered pension plans  (RPPs) and  dividend 
tax credit. Combined with fairly comprehensive indexation of the personal in- 
come tax  (PIT), these measures made Canadian income taxes more bear- 
able for many but contributed to a shortfall of revenue which produced very 
large federal deficits in the early 1980s. Since 1981 there has been a gradual 
tightening-up of the PIT, which has seen the termination of the majority of the 
important shelters. Thus, during the period  1970-90  saving incentives first 
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grew and then receded.’ There was  a corresponding hump in Canadian per- 
sonal saving rates, which peaked in  1982. The extent of  the causal relation 
between these trends is an extremely interesting question. Some light may be 
thrown on this by the behavior of Canadian saving rates during the 199Os, since 
a distinct new  phase began in  1991. In  that year a sweeping reform of  the 
RRSP/RPP system was introduced, and new  higher contribution limits and 
carry-forwards are being phased in over the period 1991-95. 
In addition to setting out the important features of  Canadian PIT and re- 
viewing recent tax history, this paper assembles a variety of data which provide 
a foundation for future analysis of the likely effects of the tax system on the 
level and composition of saving. We  look at the national accounts figures on 
saving, national balance sheet data on household wealth and its composition, 
consumer survey data on both saving and wealth holding, and data from tax 
records on contributions to sheltered saving plans. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents an overview of 
household wealth holding and saving in  Canada since 1970, using national 
accounts, national balance sheet, and sample survey data. In section 2.3 the 
relevant current features, and recent evolution, of the Canadian tax system are 
set out. The structure and use of tax-deferred retirement savings plans, and the 
salient features of social security in Canada, are reviewed in section 2.4. Fi- 
nally, existing evidence on the impacts of government incentives for saving, on 
revenue as well as saving, is discussed in Section 2.5. 
2.2  Overview of the Household Balance Sheet 
One significant contribution of this paper may be to help researchers who 
may  be unfamiliar with Canadian data sources find information on Canada’s 
tax system and household behavior. We begin, therefore, with a brief descrip- 
tion of four data sources and then use these to shed some light on the household 
balance sheet. 
2.2.1 
One source is the Canadian system of  National Accounts. These include 
the Income and Expenditure Accounts, the Financial Flow Accounts, and the 
National Balance Sheet Accounts. The Income and Expenditure Accounts pro- 
vide information on gross domestic product (GDP) income-based, GDP expen- 
diture-based, and their components. They monitor four main sectors-“per- 
sons and unincorporated business,” “other business enterprises and financial 
intermediaries,” “government,” and “transactions with the rest of the world.” 
The difference between income and outlay (excluding capital consumption al- 
A Brief Description of Some Data Sources 
l. While we are confident that this is the right way to summarize the overall trend, as discussed 
in  the body of the  paper, the  introduction of  a lifetime capital gains exemption in  1985 (whose 
limit grew to $lOO,OOO,  where it was capped in the 1988 tax year), and a small increase in RRSP 
contribution limits in 1986. softened the withdrawal of  other shelters in the late 1980s. 21  Government Incentives and Household Saving in Canada 
lowances) for each sector is gross saving. Over any time period, each sector’s 
gross saving plus capital assistance equals its net acquisition of  nonfinancial 
assets (investment) plus the excess of lending over borrowing. The Financial 
Flow Accounts measure transactions in financial assets that correspond to the 
saving and investment decisions of each sector. They also provide much more 
detail, especially on financial intermediaries, as the four sectors of the Income 
and Expenditure Accounts become 13 sectors in the Financial Flow Accounts. 
The National Balance Sheet Accounts comprise corresponding estimates of 
the stocks of physical and financial assets and liabilities.2 We  will use these 
quite heavily to see what financial and nonfinancial assets Canadian house- 
holds hold in the aggregate. 
Statistics Canada also releases public-use sample tapes which report on indi- 
vidual responses to questionnaires based on subsamples of the Labour Force 
Survey sampling frame. In carrying out the research for this project, we will 
employ microdata drawn from various public-use sample tapes-four  Family 
Expenditure (FAMEX) Surveys, two income, asset, and debt surveys by  the 
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), and the annual SCFs (income) for eco- 
nomic families and  individual^.^ The FAMEX surveys are conducted in Febru- 
ary and March and collect information on each household’s income and expen- 
ditures during the previous calendar year; we have information for the 1978, 
1982, 1984, and 1986 calendar years. The SCFs are conducted in late April 
and early May every year. About every seven years, the SCF measures family 
assets and debts as of the date of the survey and, as it always does, income for 
the previous calendar year, We  have  SCF asset and debt data for ApriVMay 
1977 and 1984. Public-use tapes for surveys of income exist for 1971-81  (bien- 
nial) and then 1982-90  (annual). 
Two more sources of information are Taxation Statistics (annual), which is 
published by  Revenue Canada (Ottawa, Ontario), and The  National Finances 
(annual) and  The Provincial  and Municipal Finances  (biennial), which are 
published by the Canadian Tax Foundation (Toronto, Ontario). The first publi- 
cation contains facsimiles of federal income tax forms as well as descriptions 
of the tax code and tables based on samples of taxpayers. The other two publi- 
cations provide succinct summaries of changes to the tax code as well as tables 
on the costs of various programs and the beneficiaries of these programs. 
In  the next section, we  use some of  the macrodata from the Income and 
Expenditure Accounts and the National Balance Sheet Accounts to initiate our 
exploration of personal saving and taxation. Thereafter we turn to microdata 
to focus on the asset and debt-holding behavior of Canadian families. 
2. See Statistics Canada (1989) for a careful description of the role of the Income and Expendi- 
ture Accounts, the Financial Flow Accounts, and National Balance Sheet Accounts in the Cana- 
dian system of National Accounts. Many of the most frequently used data series are available in 
machine-readable form on CANSIM, a computerized data-retrieval system operated by Statistics 
Canada. 
3. Microdata tapes may be purchased from the Data Dissemination Division, Statistics Canada, 
Tunney’s Pasture, Ottawa, Canada, KIA OT6. 22  John B. Burbidge and James B. Davies 
Fig. 2.1 
Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM matrix no. 6632. 
Nore: “Personal income” includes the income of unincorporated  businesses as well as persons 
and excludes capital consumption allowances and any capital assistance  provided by  the 
government (1990 personal income of $580 billion may be compared with 1990 GDP at market 
prices of $670 billion). “Personal taxes” are income and payroll taxes paid by persons and 
unincorporated  businesses less funds transferred from the government to this sector (e.g., interest 
on the public debt). “Consumption” includes purchases of all new consumer durables (e.g., new 
cars), except housing. 
Shares of personal income, 1970-90 
Evidence from Macrodata 
One may obtain some sense of the interaction between taxation and saving 
by  using the Income and Expenditure Accounts to study the distribution of 
personal income across consumption, personal taxes, and saving, for the years 
1970-90,  as shown in figure 2.1. Figure 2.1 reveals that, according to the Na- 
tional Accounts measure, saving as a fraction of  personal income exhibited a 
hump-shaped pattern over the 1970-90 peri~d.~  The saving rate out of personal 
income peaked at 14 percent in 1982, which represents a saving rate out of 
disposable income of nearly 18 percent. Figure 2.1 also shows the increase in 
4. Personal savings, as measured by  the National Accounts, are obtained by  subtracting con- 
sumption from disposable income. The latter may be adjusted by  subtracting the purely inflation- 
ary component of interest income. This flattens the personal saving series somewhat, but does not 
remove the measured rise in saving over the period 1970-81  (Beach et al. 1988,24-29). A further 
adjustment to include accruing capital gains in income makes personal saving highly volatile, and 
makes it difficult to generalize about trends (Dagenais 1992). 23  Government Incentives and Household Saving in Canada 
Fig. 2.2 
Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM matrix no. 792. 
Components of national net worth, 1970-90 
the ratio of personal taxes to personal income after 1985. The increase in the 
share of personal income taxed away has been associated with a decline in the 
apparent saving rate out of personal income. In fact, the National Accounts- 
based saving rate mirrors remarkably the at-first rising, and then declining, 
generosity of tax incentives for saving over this period. 
The 13 sectors monitored in the National Balance Sheet Accounts may be 
aggregated to yield a picture of the country’s net worth. These accounts provide 
annual estimates of the market value of physical and financial assets and liabil- 
ities. Physical assets comprise land, residential structures, consumer durables, 
nonresidential structures, machinery and equipment, and inventories. Net fi- 
nancial assets from the country’s point of view represent its net claims on assets 
in the rest of  the world, if positive, or the rest of the world’s net claims on the 
country, if negative. The sum of the value of physical and net financial assets 
is the country’s net worth. 
Figure 2.2 shows the components of national net worth for the period 1970- 
90. Particularly noteworthy is the decline in real net worth after 198  1; the 1981 
level was not exceeded until  1987. Increases and declines in net worth are 
associated with similar movements in its components. The shares of land, resi- 
dential structures, consumer durables, and so on, are very stable. Even Cana- 
da’s net foreign indebtedness rose only from 11.2 percent of net worth in 1970 
to 12.7 percent of net worth in 1990, which is somewhat surprising in view of 24  John B. Burbidge and James B. Davies 
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Fig. 2.3  Components of personal net worth, 1970-90 
Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM matrix no. 75 1. 
the very  large deficits run over much of  this period by  the federal govern- 
ment. 
Figure 2.3 repeats figure 2.2 for the personal and unincorporated business 
sector. Like national net worth, personal net worth declined in real terms after 
1981, but only for two years. Once again no component appears to have grown 
out of step with the rest. One interesting feature of figure 2.3 is the size of net 
financial assets relative to real assets. The major items in net financial assets 
are currency and bank deposits, deposits in other institutions, bonds, shares, 
and the assets of private pension funds. For the “average household’s” portfo- 
lio, real wealth is more important than net financial wealth. It is also worth 
noting that wealth held in the form of land is about equal to wealth held in the 
form of consumer durables. Another important implication of figure 2.3 is that 
about half of personal wealth is held in real assets which attract no personal 
income tax (PIT): owner-occupied houses (including  the value of the land they 
stand on) and consumer durables. 
We  have obtained national balance sheet data from Statistics Canada which 
enable us to examine the components of personal financial assets, including 
RRSPs, private pension funds, saving through life insurance, bonds, shares, 
and currency/deposits, for the period  1980-90.  The shares of  each category 
are shown in figure 2.4. The share accounted for by  RRSPs clearly has the 
highest growth rate, rising from 4 percent in 1980 to 10 percent in  1990. The 25  Government Incentives and Household Saving in Canada 
Fig. 2.4  Shares of personal financial assets, 198&!lO 
Source: Special compilation by Statistics Canada. 
share of another tax-sheltered instrument, private pensions, also grew, from 17 
percent in 1980 to 22 percent in 1990. Currency/deposits and shares declined 
in importance over the 1980s. It  is reassuring to observe that tax incentives 
do seem to exert some influence on portfolio composition. Savings have been 
channeled more and more into the few remaining fully sheltered forms, fleeing 
assets which are increasingly exposed to income taxation. 
We  saw above that about one-half of personal net worth is in the form of 
owner-occupied housing and consumer durables, neither of which is taxable 
under the PIT. Figure 2.4 indicates that currently about one-third of personal 
financial assets are in fully sheltered forms-RRSPs  or private pensions. Put- 
ting these two facts together, about two-thirds of personal wealth is fully shel- 
tered from PIT in the Canadian system. Income on the remaining one-third is 
in principle fully taxable, but the effective tax rates vary widely, as implied by 
the discussion in section 2.3. 
Evidence from Microdata 
The public-use tapes from the 1977 and 1984 SCFs include information on 
households’ financial assets (e.g., deposits, bonds,  stocks and  shares, and 
RRSPs)  and  nonfinancial  assets  (e.g.,  market  values  of  cars  and  owner- 
occupied homes and equity in businesses). While households were asked to 26  John B. Burbidge and James B. Davies 
Table 2.1  Financial and Nonfinancial Assets and Net Worth of Families and 
Unattached Individuals: 1W7  and 1984 SCFs (1990  $) 
1977  1984 
Financial  Nonfinancial  Net  Financial  Nonfinancial  Net 











No. of observations 
25,557  101,355 
694  1,165 
5,020  64,758 






107,790  27,724  98,192  110,374 
2,306  546  1,293  2,768 
49,873  6,020  58,457  50,980 






Source: Authors’ calculations using Statistics Canada’s SCF public-use microdata tape. 
report premiums paid for employer-sponsored pension plans and life insurance 
policies, it would be very difficult to estimate private-pension wealth or life- 
insurance wealth from these numbers. Also absent are estimates of wealth held 
in the form of  consumer durables other than vehicles and housing. The re- 
porting of debts is much more comprehensive but it lacks the detail accorded 
assets. These facts mean that reported net worth is underestimated; for ex- 
ample, if a household had taken out a bank loan to purchase a refrigerator, the 
liability would have been recorded but not the asset. They also imply that one 
cannot obtain clean estimates of  net worth in financial versus nonfinancial 
assets; the data do not permit one to determine whether a loan is for the pur- 
chase of, say, shares or an automobile. In tables 2. l and 2.2 we report financial 
assets and nonfinancial assets (none of  the household’s debt is attributed to 
these assets) and net worth (total assets minus total debts). 
It is clear from table 2.1 that, while average levels of household assets and 
net worth are substantial, many households hold little wealth, particularly fi- 
nancial assets. Median holdings of  financial assets in  1990 dollars (about 
$5,000 in 1977  and $6,000 in 1984) may be compared to each survey’s estimate 
of median after-tax income of about $28,000 for both years. Over 60 percent 
of  households have at least some equity in housing, which accounts for the 
relatively higher numbers for nonfinancial assets and net worth. It is intriguing 
that .5 (median) and .8 quantiles for nonfinancial assets declined between 1977 
and 1984. Since the rise in median financial assets more or less matches the 
rise in median net worth, households appear to have reduced their debts over 
this period. This is not surprising since interest rates were extraordinarily  high 
in the early 1980s. Finally, we note that the share of wealth held by the top 5 
percent of households was virtually constant across the two surveys but that 27  Government Incentives and Household Saving in Canada 
Table 2.2  Financial and Nodnancial  Assets and Net Worth of  Urban, 
Married-Couple Families: 1977 and 1984 SCFs (1990 $1 
1977  1984 
Financial  Nonfinancial  Net  Financial  Nonfinancial  Net 
Assets  Assets  Worth  Assets  Assets  Worth 
Weighted means  23,799  114,818  111,323  34,787  123,818  136,275 
Quantiles 
.2  1,502 
.5 (median)  7,540 




1  70 
Shares of  top 









14,759  1,520  12,933  17,615 
78,581  10,139  90,530  81,071 






Source: Authors’ calculations using Statistics Canada’s SCF public-use microdata tape. 
the share of the top 10 percent rose slightly, and the shares of the top 2 percent 
and 1 percent fell slightly between 1977 and 1984.5 
Measuring the assets and debts of any household is difficult, but it is particu- 
larly so for those whose income originates primarily from self-employment 
(e.g., farming or fishing). In addition, it is instructive to focus on a more homo- 
geneous group of households. Table 2.2 repeats table 2.1 for urban households 
with the following characteristics:  married couples, husband’s age greater than 
25, husband not self-employed, and husband’s main occupation not farming 
or fishing. 
As one might expect, means and quantiles are generally higher in table 2.2; 
median financial and nonfinancial assets and median net worth are about 50 
percent higher for both years.  Nevertheless, for most households financial 
assets are still a small proportion of after-tax incomes, which, in 1990 dollars, 
were about $38,000 in 1977 and $39,000 in 1984. It is also not surprising that 
wealth is less concentrated within a more homogeneous group of households. 
All of the percentages reported in table 2.2 are lower than the corresponding 
numbers in table 2.1. The sharp increase in apparent wealth concentration be- 
tween 1977 and 1984, however, is surprising, especially since there was little 
5. As is the case with most sample surveys, there are major difficulties in using the SCF surveys 
to estimate inequality in the distribution of wealth (see Davies 1979).  The top shares shown in the 
table are underestimates since, in practice, the surveys do not reach very far into the upper tail. 
The highest net worth of  a family observed in the  1984 SCF, for example, was $6 million. By 
consulting journalistic sources and work done by  private consultants, Davies (1993) concludes 
that in 1984 the share of  the top 1 percent in the Canadian wealth distribution was likely less than 
in the United States or Britain, but quite a bit higher than indicated by the SCF. A number in the 
range 25-30  percent is a “best guess.” There is insufficient evidence to establish trends over time. 28  John B. Burbidge and James B. Davies 
Fig. 2.5  Components of family financial assets by age, 1977 
Source: Statistics Canada, 1977 SCE 
change for the full samples in table 2.1 and that was mainly in the opposite di- 
rection.6 
We have used these data to examine the portfolio composition of household 
financial assets and debt, conditional on husband’s age. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 
study the four main assets in  the average household’s portfolio of  financial 
assets, by age, for 1977 and 1984. Two points are worth noting. First, for each 
year, middle-aged families have more diversified portfolios than either younger 
or older families. Second, between 1977 and 1984, families at all stages of the 
life cycle substituted RRSPs for deposits in financial institutions. 
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 show the components of household debt. The 1977 and 
1984 SCFs group debt into three categories: (i) mortgage outstanding on 
owner-occupied house; (ii) consumer debt, which includes charge accounts 
and all credit card debt, loans from chartered banks secured by  household 
goods, certain loans from chartered banks, trust companies, and other financial 
6. The increase in apparent inequality is not simply due to outliers. This is indicated by  the 
increasing gap between median and .8 quantile wealth between the two years. In  1977 wealth 
at the .8 quantile was  110.9 percent higher than the median; in 1984 the gap had increased to 
128.5 percent. 29  Government Incentives and Household Saving in Canada 
Fig. 2.6  Components of family financial assets by age, 1984 
Source: Statistics Canada, 1984  SCF. 
intermediaries; and (iii) other debt, which includes loans from chartered banks 
secured by  stocks and bonds, loans for the renovation of residential property, 
student loans, loans from stock brokers, insurance companies, savings banks, 
etc., unpaid bills for medical and dental care, and money borrowed from mem- 
bers of other households. Figures 2.7 and 2.8 clearly reveal the predominance 
of mortgage debt at all stages of the life cycle, with some tendency for mort- 
gage debt to decline in importance with age. The graphs for 1977 and 1984 
are very similar except in two respects. First, the 70-75  age group had a much 
larger share of its debt in mortgages in  1984 than in  1977. Second, “other” 
debt was more important late in the life cycle in 1984 than in 1977. We  now 
turn to a description of the rules for the taxation of capital income. 
2.3  Taxation of Capital Income 
This section outlines the general features of the Canadian PIT and its treat- 
ment of capital income, other than the provisions for sheltered retirement sav- 
ing, which are discussed in section 2.4. 30  John B. Burbidge and James B. Davies 
Fig. 2.7  Components of family  debt by age, 1977 
Source: Statistics Canada, 1977 SCF. 
2.3.1  General Features of PIT 
The Canadian PIT is levied on an individual basis and, since the 1987 tax 
reform, has imposed marginal tax rates at the federal level of  17, 26, and 29 
percent in three tax brackets. Since 1987 a system of nonrefundable personal 
credits rather than deductions has been in force. There are also sizable refund- 
able credits-the  GST (sales tax) and child tax credits-which  introduce an 
element of  negative income tax.7 Provincial PIT is a flat percentage of  the 
federal tax  (although not  in  Quebec, which has a separate PIT), except for 
various provincial surtaxes and special credits (e.g., property tax credits for 
low-income or elderly taxpayers) implemented from time to time. 
7. In 1991 the 17,26, and 29 percent tax rates applied in brackets whose limits were 0-$28,784, 
$28,785457,567, and $57,568+ in terms of taxable income. The personal credits were $1,068 
for each taxpayer plus $890 for a dependent spouse, $69 for the first two children, and $138 for 
additional children. (In single-parent families, the credit for the first child was $890.) The child 
tax credit was worth $585 per child, and the GST credit $190 per adult and $100 per child. The 
child tax and GST  credits were taxed back at a 5 percent rate on family income in excess of 
$25,000. 31  Government Incentives and Household Saving in Canada 
Fig. 2.8  Components of family debt by age, 1984 
Source: Statistics Canada, 1984 SCF. 
Figure 2.9 summarizes combined federal and Ontario tax brackets and mar- 
ginal tax rates for the period 1970-90.* There have been three significant re- 
gime changes over this period. One, the reduction in the top marginal tax rate 
from 63 to 50 percent in  1982, is not apparent in figure 2.9  since the graph 
only shows tax rates on income up to $100,000. The other two regime changes 
are apparent in figure 2.9. First, 1972 saw the PIT base broadened substantially 
and marginal tax rates on high-income individuals reduced dramati~ally.~  This 
represented a reaction to the recommendations of  the Carter Commission, 
whose “a buck is a buck” philosophy suggested that  the income tax  base 
should be as comprehensive as possible. Thus, even most transfer payments 
have been taxable since 1972. There are, of course, significant exclusions from 
the tax base. These include, for example, social assistance (“welfare”) pay- 
8. The interaction of  federal and Ontario surtaxes makes these calculations difficult. We have 
used the basic federal tax brackets and simply reported the highest marginal tax rate possible in 
each bracket. 
9. Prior to 1972, marginal tax rates on high incomes were steeply graduated, actually exceeding 



















9  _- 
72  74  78  80  82  84 
~ 
90 
Fig. 2.9  Tax brackets and marginal tax rates for a resident of Ontario earning 
less than $lOO,OOO  (1990 dollars): 1970-90 
Source: Revenue Canada, Taxation  Statistics (Ottawa, various issues). 
ments made by  municipalities and  provinces, imputed income on  owner- 
occupied housing, capital gains on principal residences, and the first $100,000 
of otherwise taxable capital gains, under the lifetime capital gains exemption. 
A second regime change is that, effective January  1, 1988, 10 tax brackets 
were collapsed to three and combined federal and provincial tax rates were 
reduced for most people (the exceptions are clear from fig. 2.9). 33  Government Incentives and Household Saving in  Canada 
Even with figure 2.9 much more work would be required to generate careful 
estimates of weighted average marginal tax rates. One can get some sense of 
what these rates would be, however, by using data from Taxation Statistics to 
see how individuals are distributed across the tax brackets graphed in figure 
2.9. These numbers show for example that, in  1970, less than  1 percent of 
taxpayers faced marginal tax rates of 66 percent or higher. More important, we 
find that median total (pretax) income in 1990 dollars is remarkably constant 
over the 1970-90 period at about $27,000, corresponding to taxable income in 
the range $15,0oO-$20,000.  Marginal tax rates in this range were very stable 
around 30 percent until 1988 when they dropped to 26 percent. Looking across 
incomes, a similar pattern is observed at most levels, although there are partic- 
ular ranges where, for example, marginal tax rates rose with tax reform in 
1988. Summarizing, it seems quite likely that average marginal tax rates in 
Canada were fairly stable from 1970-87  but declined a few points in 1988. 
Although we  are not explicitly concerned with the corporate income tax 
(CIT) in this paper, it is important to have in mind some of its salient features. 
As under the PIT, most provinces piggyback on the federal CIT, which is levied 
at a standard rate of  28 percent on “general business.” Adding on provincial 
taxes, the total CIT rate varied from 44 to 46 percent across provinces in 1991. 
Lower rates apply to manufacturing and processing profits (23 percent federal 
rate) and the first $200,000 of income for a Canadian-controlled private corpo- 
ration (CCPC)-the  “small business” rate of 12 percent. Including provincial 
taxes, the total CIT rate for manufacturing and processing varied between 30 
and 41 percent in 1991, and the small business rate varied between 16 and 23 
percent (see Canadian Tax Foundation 1992, tables 7-18  and 7-20). 
2.3.2  Incentives for Saving-General  Trends 
As mentioned earlier, the period 1970-90  saw at first increasingly generous 
tax incentives for saving, and then a decline. In contrast, the period 1990-95 
will see increasing generosity of  such incentives as new,  higher RRSPRPP 
limits are phased in. The rate of shelter innovations over the last two decades 
has been high. A complete recounting of  this history would be tedious. The 
following discussion highlights the most important trends. 
2.3.3  Interest and Pension Income 
From 1974 until  1987 (inclusive) interest received by  Canadian taxpayers 
was  partially exempt from tax under the $1,000 investment income deduc- 
tion.Io Since this deduction was fixed in nominal terms during years of signifi- 
cant inflation, it became less generous over time. In addition, since it was de- 
duction for nominal interest income, in periods of high expected inflation for 
10. This deduction is perhaps more frequently referred to as the interest and dividend deduction, 
since in the most recent period that it was in force it applied only to interest and dividends. Older 
literature, however, refers to it as the investment income deduction, since it extended to domestic 
capital gains between 1977 and 1984. 34  John B. Burbidge and James B. Davies 
many taxpayers it sheltered less of their real interest income. This aspect has, 
in practice, been quite important since the Canadian inflation rate, and nominal 
interest rates, have at times been quite high in the last two decades. 
A further important preference for interest income was that, until the mid- 
1980s some major deferrals were available. Interest accruing on a Canada Sav- 
ings Bond (CSB) or Guaranteed Investment Certificate (GIC), for example, did 
not have to be taxed until maturity. Now the interest on such assets is computed 
and taxed every year. 
Annuity income received as part of a pension plan has also received special 
treatment, effectively an incentive to save via such plans. From  1975 until 
1987, the first $1,000 of pension income was not taxed. Since then, together 
with the conversion of personal deductions to credits in the Canadian tax re- 
form, the first $1,000 is creditable for federal taxes at a 17 percent rate (which 
corresponds to the marginal tax rate in the lowest bracket). 
An  important feature of  the Canadian PIT is that no consumer interest is 
deductible. Thus, unlike most other countries, Canada does not have mortgage 
interest deductibility. This puts interest  payments (as opposed to receipts) on a 
consumption tax basis.l1  This simple provision likely acts as a powerful per- 
sonal saving incentive. Although Canadians take on considerable mortgage 
debt, they typically pay it off at a high rate. 
In contrast to the probity of the Canadian PIT with regard to consumer debt, 
there is no effective limit on the deductibility of interest for business or invest- 
ment purposes. As we shall see below, although the PIT has been tightened up 
considerably in recent years, there are various ways in which the income pro- 
duced by assets acquired with debt finance can be sheltered from tax (e.g., via 
the lifetime capital gains exemption), so that, looking at the PIT in isolation, 
the unlimited deductibility is “too generous.” Rather than simply not penaliz- 
ing saving, the tax system in such cases actually subsidizes it. 
One interesting example of excess interest deductibility  for saving or invest- 
ment purposes in the Canadian system is that prior to November 13, 1981  (bud- 
get day), interest on funds borrowed to purchase an RRSP was deductible. 
Termination of that provision is another example of how incentives for saving 
were reduced in the 1980s. 
2.3.4  Dividends 
The Canadian tax system has partially integrated corporate and personal 
income taxes, via the dividend tax credit. Under this system, dividends paid by 
taxable Canadian corporations are first “grossed up” by 25 percent, to get back 
(partially) to the underlying corporate income on which the dividend is based 
11. Note that while annual income tax advocates would, in principle, be in favor of the deduction 
of real mortgage interest, their support for such deductibility is conditional on the full income 
from owner-occupied  houses-i.e.,  both  imputed  rent  and  capital  gains-being  taxed.  Thus 
(thankfully) consumption tax and income tax supporters can agree that mortgage interest deduct- 
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(i.e., to allow for CIT payments). A credit is then allowed which is equal to 
13.33 percent of the grossed-up amount. Note that this arrangement creates a 
bias toward holding shares of domestic rather than foreign companies. 
The Canadian dividend tax credit has an obvious shortcoming in compari- 
son to a scheme of  full integration of  PIT and CIT. This is that the gross- 
up and credit factors are arbitrary and may differ considerably from what is 
appropriate for a particular corporation. For full integration the gross-up factor 
should equal 7J( 1 -  T~),  where 7,  is the actual CIT rate levied, and the credit 
rate should simply be 7,.  Thus, for a firm facing the general business tax rate 
of 28 percent, the gross-up factor should be approximately 39 percent and the 
credit rate 28 percent. For  a manufacturing and  processing firm the rates 
should be 30 and 23 percent, and for a small business they should be 14 and 
12 percent. 
Before jumping to the conclusion that the Canadian dividend tax credit is 
generally inadequate to achieve CITPIT integration, note that the credit is 
received irrespective of  whether the corporation actually paid tax. Although 
CIT has been tightened up recently, along with the PIT, it is still true that many 
profitable corporations do not pay tax-as  a result of accelerated depreciation, 
investment tax credits (still available in certain regions), resource sector incen- 
tives, and the carry-forward of losses. 
The extent of relief under the dividend tax credit can be gauged by compar- 
ing the amounts claimed with CIT collections. In 1989, for example, the divi- 
dend tax credit reduced PIT burdens by  $655 million, which compares with 
federal CIT revenues of $12.0 billion in that year. Even allowing for the fact 
that many taxpaying corporations were foreign rather than domestic, it seems 
clear that overall the dividend tax credit fell short of  canceling out the CIT 
burden of domestic corporations. 
As observed earlier, the dividend tax credit has been present throughout the 
entire period since 1970. However, its generosity has changed substantially 
over time. In 1970 and 1971 the credit was not yet of the “gross-up and credit” 
variety. Instead a credit equal simply to 20 percent of  the dividend received 
was  allowed. In  1972 a one-third gross-up was  introduced, and the credit 
equaled 20 percent of  the grossed-up amount. Then, in  1976 the credit was 
raised to the highest level it has ever taken on, with a 50 percent gross-up and 
25 percent credit on the grossed-up amount. This very generous dividend tax 
credit remained in force until the end of 1986.’*  Since then, the gross-up factor 
has been reduced in stages-to  33.3 percent in 1987, and 25 percent in 1989. 
2.3.5  Capital Gains 
Capital gains taxation was introduced in Canada in 1972 as part of the gov- 
ernment’s response to the recommendations of the Carter Commission. Cana- 
12. The 25 percent credit was reduced to 22.67 percent in  1982, but the 50 percent gross-up 
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dians are taxed on realized capital gains earned since valuation day in Decem- 
ber 1971. Currently, three-quarters of realized gains are taxable. (Prior to the 
1987 tax reform only one-half of gains were taxed.) Principal residences are 
exempt, and each taxpayer has a standard $100,000 lifetime capital gains ex- 
emption.I3  The latter can be increased to $500,000 for capital gains on disposi- 
tion of qualified farm property or the shares of small-business  corporation^.^^ 
Benefits of the lifetime exemption are deferred somewhat for those taxpayers 
who have net investment losses. Such losses, which include interest expense 
incurred for investment purposes, are cumulated starting in 1987 (in the form 
of a CNIL-cumulative  net investment loss) and must be fully offset by posi- 
tive investment income before any capital gains are eligible for the lifetime ex- 
emption. 
An  important feature of capital gains treatment in Canada is that gains are 
deemed to be realized when a taxpayer loses Canadian residence or dies. The 
latter feature-deemed  realization on death-was  felt to be sufficiently oner- 
ous that federal gift and estate taxes were abolished when capital gains taxes 
were introduced in  1972. Provincial succession duties remained in force in 
most provinces initially but have  since all been  removed. Thus Canada is 
unique now in having deemed realization of  capital gains on death but no 
wealth transfer taxes. 
Whether one counts tax-based savings incentives or looks at their provis- 
ions, there is a generally hump-shaped time profile of the generosity of shelters 
over the period 1970-90. The introduction of the lifetime capital gains exemp- 
tion in 1985 bucked this trend. How important is this exception? The cumula- 
tive amounts that could be sheltered under the exemption were initially fairly 
small-$10,000  in 1985, $25,000 in 1986, and $50,000 in 1987. And when 
the exemption hit $100,000 in 1988, a phase-in of the three-fourths taxation of 
capital gains also began. Thus, while capital gains taxation has clearly become 
lighter for small investors, for the genuinely wealthy it has become heavier- 
with the 50 percent increase in the inclusion rate swamping the lifetime ex- 
emption. 
The effective .weight of  capital gains taxes was further reduced in the pre- 
1981 period by  the availability of a sophisticated averaging device known as 
the income averaging annuity contract (IAAC). These annuities could be taken 
out to average over a lengthy period nonrecurring income, such as that earned 
by artists or professional athletes and capital gains. Tax would then be charged 
on the annuity instead of  the initial income. Astute investors could make use 
of the additional flexibility in tax timing afforded by an IAAC to significantly 
reduce their eventual total tax liability on a capital gain. 
13. The lifetime capital gains exemption was introduced in the May  1985 budget. Originally it 
was to be phased in until it reached the level of $500,000. The 1987 tax reform halted the phase- 
in at the $1OO,ooO level, except for the two types of gains indicated below. 
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2.3.6  Life Insurance 
The rules governing the tax treatment of  the investment income accruing 
under life insurance policies were completely revamped in Canada about 12 
years ago. Prior to that time, this investment income accumulated tax-free (and 
disbursements to beneficiaries were tax-free). Now, only policies which pass a 
fairly rigorous test to assure that they provide only insurance, and not an invest- 
ment element, are given exempt status. Policies issued before December 2, 
1982, however, are “grandfathered.” (Income earned as a result of premiums 
in excess of those fixed prior to December 2, 1982, is, however, taxable. Thus 
there is no marginal incentive for life insurance saving for the holders of those 
policies.) Investment income accruing in those policies issued between De- 
cember 2, 1982, and December 31, 1989 is taxed every three years, and that 
produced by policies purchased after 1989 must be included in taxable income 
every year. 
2.3.7  Other Tax Shelters 
From the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, the Canadian PIT featured a virtual 
cornucopia of  tax shelters. (This was also a period in which a very  serious 
federal deficit emerged, so that the tax shelter proliferation was probably not 
~ustainable.)’~  As under the CIT, generous investment tax credits and acceler- 
ated depreciation were available to businesspersons. In addition, a variety of 
special vehicles had been devised or sanctioned to encourage activity in hous- 
ing, mining, energy, research and development, and Canadian films. As a result 
of  the general tightening-up of  the Canadian income tax system since 1984, 
most  of  these  tax  shelters have been  eliminated. The most  significant re- 
maining ones are for exploration and development in mining and oil and gas. 
While “other tax shelters” are decreasingly important in Canada, in thinking 
about patterns of  saving and investment over the last two decades, it is quite 
important to bear their features in mind. Here we  summarize the history of 
shelters for housing, exploration and development, and Canadian films since 
1970. 
A tax shelter for multiple-unit residential buildings (MURBs) was intro- 
duced in  1974 at a time of  rapidly rising house prices and rents, in order to 
encourage rental construction. These MURBs  allowed losses on  approved 
projects to be deducted against other sources of income and allowed such “soft 
costs” as interest on construction financing, mortgage fees, and legal and ac- 
counting fees, which typically formed about 25 percent of  the cost of  con- 
structing a building, to be immediately expensed. Concern over revenue losses 
15. The virtually full indexation of  the PIT in this period also contributed to the development 
of the deficit problem. One could perhaps argue that the proliferation of shelters would have been 
sustainable with partial indexation. (The May  1985 federal budget introduced partial indexation, 
effective in the 1986 tax year. This system, which only adjusts brackets for increases in the CPI in 
excess of 3 percent, is still in force.) 38  John B. Burbidge and James B. Davies 
led to the requirement that soft costs be amortized over the life of a building, 
and to the eventual termination of the shelter in  1981. No new MURBs could 
be created after 1981, but existing MURBs were allowed to continue fully in 
force until June 17, 1987. After that date, if a MURB was sold, eligibility for 
special treatment of rental losses would be lost. Finally, MURBs are now close 
to  being  fully phased  out.  By  1994 they  all will  have  lost their favored 
treatment. 
Another  important housing-related incentive was  the  Registered  Home 
Ownership Savings Plan (RHOSP), also introduced in 1974,  but terminated by 
the May 1985 federal budget. This plan allowed deductible contributions  of up 
to $1,000 per year and $10,000 in total. Interest in the plan accrued tax-free, 
as in an RRSP. Funds withdrawn to purchase a house were tax-free. 
Throughout the period under consideration, there have been very generous 
incentives for exploration and development in mining and in oil and gas. Min- 
ing and energy companies can pass through their exploration and development 
expenses directly to personal investors via  limited partnerships  or  “flow- 
through shares.” The immediate tax benefits are substantial.  Canadian Explora- 
tion Expenses are immediately written off;16  Canadian Development Expenses 
receive a 30 percent write-off; Canadian Oil and Gas Property Expenses are 
written off at a 10 percent rate. 
One of the most remarkable episodes in Canadian tax history was that of the 
Scientific Research Tax Credit (SRTC), introduced in  1983 and withdrawn in 
haste only two years later (by a new government). The SRTC allowed R&D 
losses to be sold to individuals. It became an unexpectedly popular tax shelter, 
with much highly questionable “R&D” being performed in order to manufac- 
ture the credits. The revenue losses amounted to over $1 billion, despite the 
short lifespan of the shelter. 
Finally, the tax shelter for certified Canadian feature films dates from 1974. 
This initially allowed the immediate write-off of the depreciable costs of pro- 
ducing a film with specified levels of Canadian inputs. This was replaced by a 
reduction in the depreciation  rate to 50 percent, and then to 30 percent in 1988. 
The shelter now applies to videotape as well as film. Alongside the decreased 
tax incentive there has been much less activity in the Canadian feature film in- 
dustry. 
2.3.8  Alternative Minimum Tax 
An important feature of the current Canadian PIT is the alternative minimum 
tax (AMT) introduced in 1986, which may have a dramatic effect on the effec- 
tive marginal tax rate on personal capital income if  an investor has received 
16. Canadian Exploration Expenses (CEE) are included in the calculation of the cumulative net 
investment loss (CNIL) referred to above. Thus, making use of these expenses may result in tax 
being paid on capital gains that otherwise could qualify for the lifetime capital gains exemption. 
(Note, again, that the taxpayer does not permanently lose access to his lifetime capital gains ex- 
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large capital gains or made significant investments in tax shelters. In the calcu- 
lation of AMT, a basic exemption of $40,000 is allowed, and individuals retain 
their basic  personal tax  credits  (but  not  the dividend tax  credit discussed 
above). The federal minimum tax rate was 17 percent in 1991; adding provin- 
cial taxes brings this up to 25-28  percent across the provinces. These rates 
are applied to “adjusted taxable income,” which differs from ordinary taxable 
income through the addition of the nontaxable quarter of capital gains, RRSP 
and RPP contributions, deductions for Canadian oil and gas exploration and 
development expenses, and losses arising from capital cost allowance claims 
on MURBs or Canadian films (see above). 
2.4  Tax-deferred Retirement Savings and Social Security 
There are several important forms of deferred retirement saving in Canada: 
(i) employer- or union-based pensions-known  as registered pension plans 
(RPPs), (ii) individual accounts similar to IRAs in the United States-known 
as registered retirement savings plans (RRSPs), and (iii) deferred profit sharing 
plans (DPSPs).I7  The main element is the RRSPRPP system, which has always 
been integrated and has recently been rationalized and enhanced (starting in 
1991) (see Horner 1987). The enhancement of this system moves contrary to 
many of  the other changes in the Canadian PIT in recent years, which have 
increased the taxation of capital income. 
2.4.1  RRSP/RPP Contribution Limits 
As in most countries, Canadians can save via occupational pension plans- 
RPPs-where  contributions are deductible, income accrues tax-free, and pen- 
sion income is taxed when it is received. Both employer and employee contri- 
butions are deductible. There are two major types of RPP: defined-benefit and 
money-purchase plans.  Defined-benefit plans have  been  the most  popular, 
since until recently it was possible to shelter more saving under these plans 
than under money-purchase plans. 
Under the former RRSPRPP system, taxpayers who were not members of 
an RPP could each year contribute to an RRSP the lesser of $5,500 or 20 per- 
cent of earnings. Taxpayers covered by  an RPP at work, and their employers, 
could each contribute up to $3,500 to an RPP. In addition, the taxpayer could 
contribute to an RRSP as long as the combined (nonemployer) contributions 
17. Deferred profit sharing plans are similar to money-purchase pension plans, except that they 
give generally greater flexibility. They are not subject to federal or provincial pension benefits 
legislation; there is more flexibility in the time pattern of Contributions; investments in the shares 
of the employer corporation are allowed; withdrawal prior to termination of employment and pay- 
out in  either  lump sum or installment  form is allowed. The contribution limit is the lesser of 
(a) 18 percent of salary or (h) 50 percent of the money-purchase RPP contribution limit. The use 
of DPSPs has declined dramatically since new rules denying a deduction for contributions to plans 
for the benefit of significant shareholders and related persons were introduced. We have not looked 
at DPSPs in any detail in this study. 40  John B. Burbidge and James B. Davies 
Table 2.3  RRSP Contribution Limits, 1970-94 
Nominal Dollars  1989 Dollars 
Not RF’P  RPP  Not RF’P  RPP 
































































































Source: Authors’ compilation from standard references. 
Note:  PA = “pension adjustment.” The PA  is the sum of  pension credits under DPSPs or RPPs. 
For money-purchase plans, this is simply the sum of  employer and employee contributions. For 
defined-benefit plans an imputation is made. 
dIndexed  to average wage for subsequent years. 
did not exceed the lesser of $3,500 or 20 percent of earnings. These contribu- 
tion limits were held constant, in nominal dollars, from 1976 to 1985 (inclu- 
sive). In 1986 the $5,500 RRSP contribution ceiling was raised to $7,500 and 
the $3,500 limit on employee contributions to RPPs was removed. The $7,500 
limit remained in place from 1986 to 1990 inclusive. (See table 2.3 for a sum- 
mary of these changing limits.) 
A far-reaching reform of  the RRSP/RPP system was first proposed in the 
February 1984 federal budget. The main elements of the reform would be an 
increase in contribution room for money-purchase plan RPPs to give them 
treatment equivalent to that of  defined-benefit plans, improved portability of 41  Government Incentives and Household Saving in Canada 
plans, a phase-in of increased contribution limits to the lesser of $15,500 or 18 
percent of earnings (for all RPP plus RRSP contributions) by  1990, indexation 
of contribution limits to the average wage after 1990, and a cany-forward of 
unused contribution room to later tax years (now limited to seven years). These 
main elements remain in place in the reform, implemented in the 1991 tax year, 
but with several postponements of the reform, the real steady-state contribution 
limits will be smaller than originally anticipated, since they will hit $15,500 
in nominal terms in 1995, rather than 1990, and thereafter be indexed to the 
average wage. 
In  addition to setting out the history of  nominal RRSPRPP contribution 
limits, table 2.3 reports these numbers in constant 1989 dollars. Until 1991 
there was a ratchet effect, with the real value increasing discretely from time 
to time, with the adjustments in nominal contribution limits, and declining 
between adjustments. Interestingly, real contribution limits were at their peak 
in 1972. This peak was almost regained in 1976, but by  1985 half the real value 
of  the limits was gone. If  moderate rates of  inflation are experienced in the 
next four years, the $15,500 limit of 1995 should approximately match the real 
1972 or  1976 contribution limits. Thus, those who believe that high RRSP 
contribution limits were behind the historically high Canadian personal saving 
rates in the 1970s might expect a resurgence of saving in Canada in the 1990s. 
2.4.2  Portfolios and Withdrawals 
An important aspect of the RRSPRPP system is that there are restrictions 
on the portfolios that can be held. As elsewhere, the direction of investment of 
pension plan assets is closely regulated. One important feature of this regula- 
tion in Canada is that only up to 15 percent of the portfolio may be in foreign 
assets. On the RRSP side, there is a similar restriction on foreign investments. 
In addition, funds have largely been confined to investment in bonds, shares, 
mortgages, or life insurance policies. The May  1985 budget, however, intro- 
duced a number of features to encourage pension plans to invest in small busi- 
ness, and also allowed RRSPs to be invested in the shares of  private Cana- 
dian corporations. 
Individual control over portfolio composition is relatively rare under the in- 
stitutional pension (RPP) component of the system but does occur under some 
money-purchase RPPs. In contrast, RRSP investors have great discretion over 
the type of assets they choose to hold via their choice of type of plan. Complete 
control can be achieved using a "self-directed" plan, under which the issuer (a 
bank or trust company) will adjust the portfolio whenever desired by the saver. 
Management fees for such plans are modest and they are becoming increas- 
ingly popular.1s  Self-administered plans are still chosen by a small minority of 
18. For example, the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce currently offers self-directed mu- 
tual fund RRSPs with a $25 annual management fee and a $15 withdrawal fee. These fees are tax- 
deductible. The portfolio may be adjusted daily. 42  John B. Burbidge and James B. Davies 
RRSP holders, however. In the non-self-administered category there are five 
basic types of plans: (1) “guaranteed” plans, providing a fixed rate of return, 
(2) “income” plans, with investments in fixed-income securities, (3) “equity” 
plans, invested in stocks, (4) “mortgage” plans, and (5) registered life insur- 
ance policies, under lwhich the savings portion of the policy is treated as equiv- 
alent to an RRSP (now a less popular option than in earlier years). Due to 
increasing competition in the Canadian financial industries, rates of return on 
these various plans are now generally very attractive. A large variety of prod- 
ucts are available, however, and savers must look closely at their fees and pro- 
visions. Routine advice is to select a plan without penalty, or with a low pen- 
alty, for early withdrawal or transfer of funds to another RRSP. Provided this 
advice is followed, the saver retains considerable flexibility and discretion in 
the choice of saving vehicle, even when the plan is not self-directed. 
All funds in an RPP must be converted into an annuity before the taxpayer’s 
seventy-first birthday. In contrast, great flexibility is allowed in cashing out an 
RRSP. First, taxpayers may withdraw all of the funds at any point and include 
them in taxable income that year. Second, they may purchase an annuity (possi- 
bly a joint-survivor annuity with spouses) prior to their seventy-first birthday. 
The annuity payments would enter taxable income, except for the first $1,000, 
which would be eligible for the pension income deduction. Third, it is possible 
to transfer withdrawals from an RRSP to a registered retirement income fund 
(RRIF), where savings continue to accumulate tax-free, but a series of annual 
payments must be made from the fund, which will exhaust it by the taxpayer’s 
ninety-first birthday. 
Another important aspect is that part or all of  an RRSP contribution may 
actually be made to a spouse’s RRSP. This allows an element of income split- 
ting-and  not just in retirement, since the amount contributed to the spouse’s 
RRSP may  be withdrawn after just two years, being treated as the spouse’s 
income. 
The most recent modification of RRSP withdrawal options was the introduc- 
tion in the February 1992 federal budget of a home buyers’ plan, under which 
up to $20,000 could be withdrawn tax-free from an RRSP in order to buy a 
house. A couple could therefore withdraw up to $40,000 for this purpose. The 
$40,000 would have to be restored to the RRSPs over the next 15 years, but the 
net effect would be a transfer of equity from the RRSP to the home. This plan 
will of course strengthen the incentive to save via an RRSP for many people, 
as well as having an effect on portfolio composition. 
2.4.3  Participation in RPPs and Use of RRSPs 
Flows 
Tables 2.4  and 2.5 present summary information on the incidence of  em- 
ployee RPP and RRSP contributions and the amounts contributed in 1981 and 
1989, by age and income groups, respectively. These data come from unpub- 43  Government Incentives and Household Saving in Canada 
Table 2.4  RRSP and RPP Contributors and Contributions,  by  Age Group 
1981  1989 
Age  RPP  RRSP  RPPorRRSP  RPP  RRSP  RPPorRRSP 
% of C/QPP Contributors Contributing 
<25  18  3  19 
25-34  43  13  49 
35-44  51  20  58 
45-54  51  29  62 
55-64  56  36  68 
Total  42  17  49 
Average Amount per Contributor (1989 $) 
<25  554  1,220  701 
25-34  898  1,489  1,211 
35-44  1,153  1,761  1,644 
45-54  1,139  1,991  1,893 
55-64  1,056  2,074  1,992 





































Source: Unpublished tabulations, Department of Finance, Government of  Canada. 
Note: C/QPP stands for the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans. Among those of working age, the 
group of contributors to these plans corresponds closely to the set of individuals who are  eligible 
to make RRSP or RPP contributions. 
lished Department of Finance compilations. Tables 2.6 and 2.7 supplement this 
flow data with information on the stock of  RRSP wealth held by families in 
1984, according to Statistics Canada’s Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF). 
Table 2.4 shows the fraction of contributors to the Canada and Quebec Pen- 
sion Plans (C/QPP) who also contributed to RPPs, RRSPs, or either type of 
plan, as well as amounts contributed, by  age group.I9 Note, first, that the in- 
cidence of  both  RPP and RRSP contributions rises with  age, but does so 
more steadily for RRSPs. There is a plateau of about 50 percent contributing 
to RPPs from age 35 to age 64. In contrast, the amount contributed to an RPP 
has a hump-shaped profile, with the maximum contribution occurring in the 
35-44-year-old  group in 1981 and in the 45-54-year-old  group in 1989. The 
incidence pattern of  RPP contributions did not change very much from 1981 
to 1989, but the average contribution rose by 51 percent, with the rise being 
especially marked for older groups. 
In contrast to RPPs, the incidence, as well as average amount, of  RRSP 
contributions increased dramatically in the 1980s-in  part reflecting the disap- 
pearance and curtailment of many other tax shelters. While in 1981 only 17 
19. It is useful to divide by  the number of  ClQPP subscribers since they approximate closely 
the set of eligible RRSPRPP contributors in the working-age group. Many retirees who are not 
C/QPP subscribers make RRSP contributions, however. This results in some instances in table 
2.5 where the figures for RRSP/RPP contributors as a percentage of C/QPP subscribers exceed 
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Table 2.5  RRSP and RPP Contributors and Contributions, by Income Group 
1981  1989 
Income 
(thousand$)  RPP  RRSP  RPPorRRSP  RPP  RRSP  RPPorRRSP 
% of  C/QPP Contributors Contributing 
0-10  5  2  7  7 
10-20  19  7  25  19 
20-30  48  14  55  47 
30-40  64  23  71  66 
40-50  75  32  82  71 
50-60  82  47  90  70 
60-70  75  51  87  65 
70-80  73  61  88  59 
80-90  62  60  93  52 
90-100  53  65  90  46 
>lo0  39  71  91  28 
Total  42  17  49  40 
Average Amount per Contributor (I989 $) 
0-10  197  455  275  200 
10-20  376  979  602  490 
20-30  652  1,247  915  954 
30-40  960  1,600  1,400  1,490 
40-50  1,272  1,907  1,917  2,032 
50-60  1,553  2,042  2,420  2,582 
60-70  1,907  2,355  2,923  2,866 
70-80  1,964  2,682  3,321  3,074 
80-90  2,042  3,087  3,324  3,307 
90-100  2,103  3,510  3,727  3,659 
>lo0  2,136  4,281  4,254  3,571 


















































Source: Unpublished tabulations, Department of  Finance, Government of  Canada. 
%See n. 19. 
percent of the C/QPP population contributed to RRSPs, by  1989 this fraction 
had doubled to 34 percent. Amounts contributed also increased sharply (54 
percent overall), with the biggest increases again coming for older groups. The 
relative increase in contributions by  older groups likely reflects, in part, their 
increasing relative prosperity. It also reflects the fact that the rise in the RRSP 
contribution limit from $5,500 to $7,500 in 1986 would not benefit workers 
who earned less than $27,500 (since for them the effective limit was 20 percent 
of  earnings). Such lower-income workers are of  course more heavily repre- 
sented among the young than the middle-aged. 
Table 2.5 looks at the pattern of RRSPRPP contributions by  income group. 
The incidence of RPP contributions has a hump-shaped profile as one moves 
up the income groups, with the largest incidence occurring in the $40,000- 
$60,000 range. High-income taxpayers are more likely to be independent pro- 45  Government Incentives and Household Saving in Canada 
fessionals and businesspeople and therefore not covered by  employer/union 
pension plans. The incidence of RRSP contributions, in contrast, climbs with 
income throughout. 
One interesting change in the 1980s, indicated by table 2.5, is that the inci- 
dence of RPP contributions rose slightly in the lower-income groups and fell 
in all the groups with incomes of $40,000+. The incidence of RRSP contribu- 
tions, in contrast, rose in all income groups. While overall RRSP contributions 
went up on average by 54 percent, there was little change in the relative size 
of contributions across the income groups. On the other hand, the relative con- 
tributions of high-income contributors to RPPs increased from 1981 to 1989, 
likely reflecting the removal of  the $3,500 limit on employee RPP contribu- 
tions in 1986. 
In conclusion, amounts contributed to both RPPs and RRSPs rose substan- 
tially both in aggregate and per contributor. The pattern of incidence did not 
change radically for RPPs, but the incidence of RRSP contributions doubled 
overall, and rose for all age and income groups. Older contributors had the 
largest increase in RRSP contributions, while the highest-income groups had 
the biggest increases in RPP contributions per  contributor. These changes 
seem to be adequately explained by a general increase in the desire to use the 
RPP/RRSP saving vehicles due to the curtailment of  other shelters pushing 
against the limits set by the incidence of employer/union-based pension plans, 
and the changing constraints on employee RPP and RRSP contributions. 
While most RPP contributions will stay “locked-in” until retirement, people 
may withdraw RRSP funds at any point, and each year there is a significant 
flow of preretirement withdrawals. When attempting to get an idea of the extent 
of  net asset accumulation in this form, it is important to take into account 
these withdrawals. Unpublished tabulations from the Department of  Finance 
indicate that aggregate withdrawals as a percentage of  contributions for tax- 
payers aged less than 60 years were 16.7,21.4, and 19.2 percent in 1981, 1982, 
and  1984, respectively. The age profile shows a strong negative relation be- 
tween withdrawals and age from age 25 to age 60. (Withdrawal rates rose until 
age 25 and again after age 60.) In the recession years, 1981 and 1982, with- 
drawals were 30 percent of  contributions for those aged 25-34.  However, in 
1984, which was perhaps more “normal,” withdrawals were just 21.6 percent 
in this age group, and the relationship between age and withdrawals was overall 
much flatter than in the recession years. 
It would be interesting to look at more recent information on RRSP with- 
drawals for those of working age, especially in view of the curtailment of sev- 
eral alternative tax shelters since 1984. Nevertheless, one may provisionally 
conclude that withdrawals average about 15-20  percent of  contributions for 
those of working age. This conclusion is used to help with some rough calcula- 
tions (below) of  the stock of  RRSP wealth which people would build up at 
various ages if they continued to contribute at recently observed rates. 46  John B. Burbidge and James B. Davies 
Table 2.6  RRSP  Ownership by  Age and Income, Families and Unattached 
Individuals, 1984 SCF 
Mean 
Amount  %I  of  Financial  Mean Net 
Incidence (%)  ($1  % of Assets  Assets  worth  ($) 
Age 
<  25  10.6 
25-34  27.2 
35-44  34.1 
45-54  42.8 
55-64  43.8 
>65  15.6 
Income (thousand $) 
<5  3.9 
5-10  3.5 
10-15  10.3 
15-25  22.1 
25-35  35.1 
35-45  45.3 
45-60  54.9 
>  60  70.9 





























































Source: Cols.  1, 3, and 5 are taken directly from Statistics Canada, The Distribution of  Wealth in 
Canada, 1984, Publication no. 13-580 (Ottawa, 1986), 64-73,  tables 24-27;  cols. 2 and 4 were 
calculated by the authors from these tables. 
Stocks 
As  discussed earlier, Statistics Canada has conducted wealth surveys at 
roughly seven-year intervals as part of its annual Survey of Consumer Finance 
(SCF). Amounts held in RRSPs, but not in RpPs, are surveyed. Unfortunately, 
the most recent survey was conducted in 1984, so that this data source is now 
somewhat dated. However, the results of the survey appear to check out fairly 
well with independent information. They are summarized here in table 2.6. 
Table 2.6 shows the incidence of, and average amounts held in, RRSPs by 
age and income groups for families and unattached individuals in spring 1984. 
On average, overall, just $3,900 was held in this form, which is only 4.6 per- 
cent of a mean net worth of $85,344. For comparison,  this amount is compara- 
ble to the value of cars and trucks (5.3 percent of  net worth), but is just 12 
percent of equity in owner-occupied houses. As a fraction of overall financial 
assets, RRSPs were 18 percent-up  considerably from the 1977 SCF (see figs. 
2.5 and 2.6.) 
The amounts held in the form of  RRSPs, according to the 1984 SCF, are 
fairly modest. It should be borne in mind, however, that RPPs are likely to be 
about twice as great as RRSPs in value. On this basis, the combined RRSP/ 47  Government Incentives and Household Saving in Canada 
Table 2.7  Simulated “Steady-State”  Sheltered Saving Stocks (1989 $) 
1981  1986  1989 
Age  RPP  RRSP  Total 
25  646 
30  3,455 
35  7,039 
40  12,917 
45  20,419 
50  29,944 
55  42,101 
60  56,272 















































































Source: Authors’ own calculations. See text. 
RPP wealth of the 1984 SCF sample would be about 15 percent of their net 
worth, which is considerably more impressive. 
In terms of patterns across age and income groups, note first that the qualita- 
tive patterns picked up for contributions are echoed for stocks. The incidence 
of RRSP ownership rises with both age and income. The relative importance 
of RRSPs in the portfolio also tends to rise with both age and income. 
Another way of getting an idea about stocks of sheltered retirement saving 
is to do a perpetual inventow calculation based on flows. In order to get an 
actual estimate of  RRSPRPP ownership in a particular year, one would want 
to have a complete time series of contributions by age. In fact, what we have 
is data for just three years: 1981, 1986, and 1989. What we have done, there- 
fore, is to compute three alternative “steady-state’’ age profiles of RRSPRPP 
stocks which would be obtained if  the contribution patterns from the three 
different years had remained in place (in real terms) forever. A 5 percent real 
rate of return (conservative in light of real interest rates in the 1980s in Canada) 
and a 15 percent withdrawal rate at all ages have been assumed.20  It is also 
assumed that employer and employee RPP contributions were equal. 
The most striking thing about the steady-state  calculations  presented in table 
2.7 is that the amounts built up in RRSPs and RPPs are much larger than one 
would expect on the basis of the survey evidence. In 1989 dollars, the RRSP 
balances at age 60 are $20,790, $41,053, and $54,094, using the 1981, 1986 
and 1989 data, respectively. These figures, which are for individual taxpayers, 
compare with meanfamiZy holdings (converted to 1989 dollars) of just $10,121 
in 1984 according to the SCF. Part of the explanation for the difference is that 
because RRSP contributions have been trending up over time, the steady-state 
20. The results are relatively insensitive to the assumed withdrawal rate, as long as it is kept in 
the plausible range of 10-20  percent. Results are more sensitive to the interest rate. If the real rate 
of return was only 3 percent (more representative of the 1960s and early 1970s than the 5 percent 
rate used in the calculations), RRSP accumulation at age 60 would be about one-third smaller. 48  John B. Burbidge and James B. Davies 
stocks implied by any year’s contributions will naturally exceed current stocks. 
However, some part of the explanation may  lie in survey underestimation of 
RRSP holdings. 
2.4.4  Social Security2‘ 
The earnings-related  component of social security is much less important in 
Canada than in the United States. The three principal federal programs are 
Old-Age Security (OAS; its budget for the 1989-90 fiscal year was $11.8 bil- 
lion), the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS; $3.9 billion) and the Canada 
Pension Plan (CPP; 1990 expenditures were $9.5 billion).22  In addition, several 
provinces provide means-tested payments to the elderly, and many of the prov- 
inces and their municipalities provide transfers in the form of subsidized ser- 
vices (medical care, homes for the aged, and so on). 
Old-Age Security is payable to all who are age 65 or older and who meet 
certain residency requirements. As of January 1,  1991, the maximum pension 
was $354.92 per month, or $4,259 per annum. It has been indexed quarterly to 
the consumer price index (CPI) since April 1,1973. Old-Age Security benefits 
are taxable under the Income Tax Act and are also subject to the social benefits 
repayment tax introduced in  1987, which taxes back OAS payments at a rate 
of  15 percent on an individual’s net income in excess of a threshold which is 
partially indexed and stood at $5 1,765 in 1991. 
Guaranteed Income Supplement is an  income-tested supplement payable 
to OAS recipients. As of  January 1, 1991, the maximum GIS was  $421.79 
per month for a single pensioner and $211.93 for each member of a married 
couple, both of  whom had to be at least 65 years old. Thus OAS and GIs 
together guarantee elderly married couples an income of  $15,111.60 per an- 
num. However, the “tax-back rate” for GIS is 50 percent on income over and 
above GIS and OAS.23 
Canada Pension Plan is a compulsory, contributory pension plan which pays 
benefits in a variety of circumstances and which requires those working to 
make certain contributions.  Retirement pensions are based on each individual’s 
earnings history. They are designed to replace 25 percent of earnings at age 65, 
up to the average industrial  wage which stood at $30,500 in 1991.24  Benefits are 
indexed to the CPI and are taxable. In  1991, employers and employees each 
contributed 2.3 percent of earnings between $3000 and $30,500 to cover the 
costs of the program. Since CPP’s inception (in 1966) revenues have exceeded 
21, This section draws heavily on various issues of the Canadian Tax Foundation’s annual publi- 
cation, The National Finances, as well as on Burbidge (1987). 
22. Quebec operates its own public pension program, QPP. 
23. The equivalent of OAS/GIS for persons aged 60-64  years is “spouse’s allowance,” which 
has a tax-back rate of 75 percent on the OAS component. 
24. Contributors may choose to collect retirement benefits at any age between 60  and 70. The 
pension is reduced 0.5 percent per month before age 65, and increased 0.5 percent per month 
after. Thus someone retiring at age 60 collects 70 percent of the age-65 retirement pension (130 
percent for someone aged 70). 49  Government Incentives and Household Saving in Canada 
Table 2.8  Components of Pretax Income for Urban, Married-Couple  Families 
with Husband Retired: 1977,1984, and 1989 SCFs (1990 $) 
Income Year 
1976  1983  1989 
Income  Income  Income 
Weighted  Shares  Weighted  Shares  Weighted  Shares 
Means  (%)  Means  (%)  Means  (%I 
Earnings 
Investment income 

















20.9  4,692 
18.7  5,780 
30.7  7,889 
7.8  3,803 
18.2  4,507 
3.7  1,770 
100  28,441 
534 
69.8 
16.5  6,532  17.7 
20.3  6,943  18.8 
27.7  7,825  21.2 
13.4  5,803  15.7 
15.8  8,013  21.7 
6.3  1,781  4.9 
100  36,897  100 
1,468 
69.7 
~  ~~~ 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Statistics Canada’s SCF public-use microdata tape. 
expenditures and the surplus has been loaned to the provinces at below-market 
interest rates.2s  These surpluses are scheduled to fall so that CPP will become 
more like a pure pay-as-you-go program. 
Table  2.8 uses the  1977, 1984, and  1989 SCFs to give some idea of  the 
relative importance of different sources of income for elderly, urban, married- 
couple families in which the husband is “retired” and is at least 65 years old.26 
“Earnings” may arise from the activities of the wife in the labor market or from 
the self-employment income of the family (e.g., renting a room to a boarder). 
“Investment income” includes interest, dividends, and realized capital gains, 
but not the annuity income originating from having turned an RRSP into a 
retirement annuity. Unfortunately, SCF data do not permit one to isolate retire- 
ment income resulting from RRSPs; all such income is included with private 
pension income in “pensions and annuities.” “Other income” includes the pro- 
vincial supplements such as Ontario’s Guaranteed Annual Income Supplement 
(currently $83 per month with a 50 percent tax-back rate). 
Table 2.8 makes some important points: First, even though for all age groups 
together average real income was fairly constant from  1975 to  1990, mean 
income of  retired couples increased by 50 percent. Second, the combination 
OAS/GIS has declined sharply in importance, while the share of C/QPP has 
doubled from 7.8 to 15.7 percent. Third, by  1989, “pensions and annuities” 
25. The accumulated surplus stood at $39 billion in 1990. 
26. The 1990 SCF has been released by  Statistics Canada, but at the time this paper was being 
prepared, it had not been installed at our universities. 50  John B. Burbidge and James B. Davies 
had become the most important component of retirement income. Fourth, the 
share of “investment income” was virtually unchanged at 18.8 percent between 
1976 and 1989; that its share was a little higher in 1983 may reflect the high 
interest rates during the early 1980s. 
What can we say about “replacement  rates”? First, since the OAS/GIS safety 
net guarantees elderly, married couples an income over $15,000 per year, low- 
income workers likely experience an increase in  after-tax income on retire- 
ment. Second, for middle-income workers earning less than the average indus- 
trial wage, the replacement rate built into CPP is 25 percent; this sets a lower 
bound because such workers would still receive at least OAS if not some GIs. 
Many defined-benefit private pension plans integrate CPP with the private pen- 
sion and pay about 65 percent of final earnings, so for some workers, replace- 
ment rates on private and public pensions alone could exceed 70 percent. Fi- 
nally, for higher-income workers, private arrangements dominate the public 
system; depending on RRSP wealth and for some private pensions, replace- 
ment rates could once again exceed 70 percent. 
Various calculations of  replacement rates have been made by  students of 
pensions in Canada. The most comprehensive appears to have been by Wolfson 
(1979), who simulated the lifetime consequences of OAS, GIs, and C/QPP. In 
line with our above suggestion, Wolfson found that, looking at the impact of 
compulsory programs alone, “for the poorest  10 or 20% of  the population, 
average post-retirement consumption levels could well exceed average pre- 
retirement consumption levels. For the upper 50 or 70% of  the population, 
however, average post-retirement consumption levels could well be 25-50% 
below corresponding  pre-retirement levels if no other provisions for retirement 
are made” (Wolfson 1979,5-38). 
To say more about actual replacement rates, it would be exceedingly helpful 
to have panel data that followed individuals through the retirement period. Un- 
fortunately, such data are not publicly available for Canada.*’ Since earnings 
were so stable, at least over the 1980s, one may be able to build on table 2.8 
by comparing the after-tax incomes of the families included in table 2.8 with 
the after-tax incomes of “similar” families where the head is aged 55-64.  We 
use head’s education as an extra control to achieve better comparability be- 
tween the working and the retired samples. 
We  present the results of  this exercise in table 2.9. As one might expect, 
before-tax and after-tax family income rise with the husband’s education level. 
It is also not surprising that replacement rates are higher for after-tax income 
than for before-tax income. What is striking is how little replacement rates 
vary  with education level. Using after-tax income, the replacement rate for 
27. The Department of Finance has several longitudinal files of  taxpayers which are used in- 
house. Those data could be used to study actual replacement rates, but we are not aware of any 
studies that have been done. 51  Government Incentives and Household Saving in Canada 
Table 2.9  Weighted Means and Replacement Rates of Before-Tax (BT) and 
After-Tax (AT) Income for Urban, Married-Couple Families, by 
Selected Education Groups: 1989 SCF (1990 $) 
Working  Retired  Replacement Rates 
Aged 55-64  Aged 65-75  (%) 
Education Level  BT  AT  BT  AT  BT  AT 
of Husband  Income  Income  Income  Income  Income  Income 
Less than high school  62,211  49,689  31,513  28,710  51  58 
High school  72,964  57,994  40,722  35,758  56  62 
University degree  103,953  76,517  60,005  49,481  58  65 
All groups  72,034  56,229  36,897  32,864  51  58 
No. of  observations  1,193  1,468 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Statistics Canada’s SCF public-use microdata tape. 
those with less than a high school education is 58 percent, and that for the 
university-degree group is 65 percent. 
2.5  Evidence of Impacts 
2.5.1  Revenue Impacts 
The revenue impacts of  government incentives for saving in Canada have 
been most carefully studied by the Department of Finance in its preparation of 
tax expenditure accounts in 1979, 1980, and 1985.28  The relevant results of the 
1985 exercise are set out in table 2.10. We  see that the total federal revenue 
impact of the seven measures listed equaled $7,130 million, or 26.6 percent of 
actual federal revenues. Impacts on provincial government revenues were not 
estimated but would have been about 50 percent of this total, so that the aggre- 
gate loss of  revenue would be  about  $11  billion, or 3 percent of  personal 
income. 
It is clear from table 2.10 that the value of the RRSPRPP incentive dwarfs 
the others. The revenue loss from RRSPsRPPs makes up 69 percent of the 
total from the seven measures listed. Next in order of  importance come the 
$1,000 investment income deduction (abolished in  1987), the dividend tax 
credit (since, cut back considerably), exemption of investment income accru- 
ing under life insurance policies (terminated for new  policies in  1982), the 
$1,000 pension income deduction, and the oil, gas, and mining incentives. 
There has been so much change in the Canadian tax system that the figures 
28. Currently, an updated version of these calculations is being performed, but results are not 
yet available. 52  John B. Burbidge and James B. Davies 






RRSPSRPPS  4,900 
Investment income deduction  835 
Dividend tax credit  785 
Life insurance  290 
Pension income deduction  150 
RHOSPs'  125 








Total  7,130  26.6 
Sources: Col. 1, Department of Finance, Account of the Cost of  Selective Tax Measures (Ottawa, 
1985), 39-48,  table 1; col. 2 equals col.  1 divided by  total federal PIT refvenue in 1983, which 
equaled $26,809 million. 
"Registered Home Ownership Savings Plans. 
in table 2.10 do not provide a guide to the current revenue impacts of incentives 
for saving. However, some fairly shrewd guesses can be made about the magni- 
tude of the current shelters. Those shown in table 2.10 that have since disap- 
peared provided benefits equal to 4.7 percent of federal revenue. The only new 
shelter to be added is the $100,000 lifetime capital gains exemption. Even if 
this sheltered capital gains fully it would not reduce revenue by anything like 
the amount accounted for by RRSPs/RPPs. An educated guess is that the reve- 
nue loss due to this new shelter is likely to be less than 2 percent of total federal 
revenue.29 Finally,  RRSPmPP  contributions have  increased  sizably  since 
1983-by  about two-thirds by  1989, for example, whereas PIT revenue rose 
only 46.6 percent in real terms. But by  1995, RRSP contribution limits will 
have almost doubled relative to 1989, so that in the new  steady state that is 
being approached, the RRSPKPP shelter could well expand 40-50  percent 
compared to its relative size in 1983. This would imply total revenue losses 
equal to 25-30  percent of federal revenue. Adding up, when the new RRSP/ 
RPP system is completely phased in, it appears that the total revenue impact 
of personal savings incentives might be in the neighborhood of 30-35  percent 
of federal revenue, that is considerably higher than the 26.6 percent figure for 
1983 in table 2.10. 
2.5.2  Savings Impacts 
As in other countries, there has been much interest in the impact of  taxation 
on saving in Canada. Renewed interest in this question was stimulated in the 
United States by Boskin (1978), who found that, in contrast to earlier studies, 
29. The 1985 tax expenditure accounts estimated that the half-taxation of capital gains reduced 
revenue by $440 million. If the revenue from capital gains taxation was in the same neighborhood, 
as seems reasonable, it would add up to about 1.6 percent of federal revenue. 53  Government Incentives and Household Saving in Canada 
there was  a fairly large interest elasticity of  aggregate saving. Boskin’s best- 
known estimate of this number was 0.4. West (1987) replicated Boskin’s study 
for Canada, but found that the interest rate effect on saving was negative and 
insignificant. He also replicated the approach of  Summers (1982), based ex- 
plicitly on the life-cycle model, and again found either zero or negative effects. 
Positive effects were only obtained when the nominal interest rate was used 
instead of  the real rate. Beach, Boadway, and Bruce confirmed these results 
using alternative real interest rate variables (see Beach et al.  1988, 31-34). 
Beach et al. suggested that the divergence in U.S. and Canadian results could 
be explained by the upward trend in the generosity of Canadian tax incentives 
for saving in the  1960s and  1970s. Real interest rates declined in both the 
United States and Canada, but the impact one would otherwise expect on sav- 
ing was reversed in Canada by the missing tax incentives variable, it was sug- 
gested. 
There has been a great deal of discussion in the United States about whether 
IRAs stimulate saving or are simply inframarginal. Curiously, this issue has 
received much less attention in Canada, where RRSPs are relatively more im- 
portan  t . 
Since very few people are observed to save only in the form of  an IRA or 
RRSP, simple economic analysis would suggest that most IRA/RRSP saving 
is inframarginal. From this viewpoint, IRAsRRSPs just represent a rationed 
reduction in the price of retirement consumption. An  increase in contribution 
limits may have only wealth effects, and no substitution effects. 
There are important critics of  this position. They point out, for example, 
that many people who contribute less than the IRA/RRSP limit also save in 
nonsheltered forms, suggesting that the two forms of  saving are not perfect 
substitutes. Why aren’t they perfectly substitutable? Clearly, the transactions 
costs of opening and closing IRAsRRSPs may differ from those of other sav- 
ing vehicles. Also, it has been argued, the high advertising of  IRAsRRSPs 
may help to make them a distinct commodity in many people’s eyes. It is diffi- 
cult to evaluate such arguments a  priori. The question of whether IRAsRRSPs 
stimulate fresh saving is really an empirical issue. 
There are three pieces of evidence on the impact of  RRSPs on saving in 
Canada: simulations by Michael Daly and colleagues, studies done using in- 
house Department of  Finance data sets by David Wise, and the well-known 
Carroll and Summers (1987) study. 
In the early  1980s, some Canadian researchers became interested in the 
properties of  a tax system where both registered retirement savings vehicles 
and nonregistered but tax-exempt savings were present. Daly (1981) and Hood 
(1982) both showed that, under certainty and with perfect capital markets, in 
the absence of contribution limits such a system would allow ideal lifetime tax 
averaging, and would effectively convert the personal tax base from annual to 
lifetime income. Androkovich, Daly, and Naqib (1993) follow this up with a 
simulation of the effects of introducing unlimited RRSPs in a stylized repre- 54  John B. Burbidge and James B. Davies 
sentation of  the Canadian tax system. They find that there is a very sizable 
effect on capital accumulation-in  fact a greater effect than would be obtained 
via a progressive annual consumption tax. 
While we believe that tax policy simulations are interesting, in the present 
context they  seem to beg the question. (Simulated households behave ac- 
cording to the simple economics we  outlined to start with. Real households 
apparently do not all do so.) Also, individual or household-specific effects, and 
variations in preferences, may be important. Thus serious empirical work, as 
well as simulation, is required. 
In cooperation with Steven Venti and Anil Gupta, David Wise has conducted 
a series of studies for the Department of Finance since 1984. These have been 
motivated by a desire to predict the effects of the comprehensive RRSP/RPP 
reform which was originally projected in 1984 and has now been implemented 
(see the previous section). Attention in these studies has focused on the impact 
of higher contribution limits, and carry-forwards of unused contribution room, 
on taxpayers’ likelihood of contributing and on their size of contribution. The 
effect on total saving has not been modeled explicitly. 
The Venti and Wise approach is well known, and its features will not be 
detailed here (see Venti and Wise [1990], as well as the critical treatment in 
Gravelle [  19911). Rather we will confine ourselves to noting some of the quan- 
titative results that Wise et al. have found for Canada. Wise (1984, 79) con- 
cluded that a 57 percent increase in limits would cause a 28 percent rise in 
contributions, neglecting the possible impact of increased contribution limits 
on the number of   contributor^.^^ Gupta, Venti, and Wise (1992, 32) estimate 
that the seven-year carry-forward provision of  the new RRSP arrangements 
“will raise average contributions by  60 to 70 percent in the long run, with 
a peak increase of  almost 100 percent occurring six or seven years after the 
introduction of the program.” 
Carroll and  Summers (1987) compared savings rates in  Canada and the 
United States from 1961 to 1985. The authors try to explain why the Canadian 
and U.S. savings rates, after being similar for many years, diverged in the mid- 
1970s. One of their independent variables is RRSP contributions. This variable 
was statistically significant in explaining part of the difference in savings rates 
between the two countries, although the variable was not significant in a stand- 
alone regression for the United States. It would be interesting to see the results 
of a repetition of the study after a few more years, given the current phasing- 
in of higher RRSP limits in Canada versus the post- 1986 curtailment of IRAs 
in the United States. 
30. Wise (1984) simulates the impact of alternative schemes for changing contribution limits. 
No convenient summary measure indicating the degree of sensitivity of contributions to changes 
in the limits is provided by these experiments, however. The numbers quoted here come from a 
simpler experiment: indexing contribution limits between 1979 and 1985 to offset the 57 percent 
increase in prices over this interval. 55  Government Incentives and Household Saving in Canada 
2.6  Conclusion 
This paper has  examined the  evolution of  tax  incentives for  saving in 
Canada, particularly tax-deferred retirement saving plans, over the  period 
1970-91. From 1970  until about 1981, these incentives increased both in num- 
ber and, broadly speaking, in generosity. Subsequently, incentives were for the 
most part cut back. Finally, a new phase began in 199  1 with the gradual intro- 
duction of considerably higher contribution limits and other liberal features in 
the RRSPRPP system. 
An interesting  result of this paper is the identification of a strong gross corre- 
lation between tax incentives for saving and the personal saving rate. The latter 
peaked in 1982 and displayed a hump-shaped time profile over the 1970-90 
period, matching the rise and fall of  tax incentives very closely. In contrast, 
real interest rates, which one might have  expected to lie behind the saving 
trends, behaved quite differently over the two decades. They fell until 1975 
and then began an upward trend to 1990. A tentative conclusion is that the 
effects of tax incentives were much stronger than those of real interest rates 
over this period. Careful empirical work would be required to properly assess 
this conclusion. 
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